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1.  Introduction 
The New Trade Theory is characterized by an extensive use of IO-models of imperfect 
competition  due  to  the  generally  accepted  notion  that  many  international  markets  are 
imperfect.I  Another  property  of international  markets  is  the  presence  of vertical  quality 
differences  ("high"  vs.  "Iow"  product  quality)  between  substitutable  products.  Product 
differentiation  of this  type  is  an  important  dimension  in  international  trade,  since  trade  in 
differentiated  but  substitutable  products  (intra-industry  trade)  has  grown  most  in  the  last 
decades.  Explanations  for  intra-industry  trade  are  based  on  the  cross-hauling  or reciprocal-
dumping argument.2  In this context, product quality is a strategic variable for the firm that can 
be  influenced  by  trade  policy.3  The  resulting  product  asymmetries  are  often  attributable  to 
historically  grown  regional  differences  in  technology  and  production  costs4  (e.g.  in  the 
European car market),  but  they  are  also  influenced  by  regional  asymmetries  with  respect  to 
market size,  income,  demand,  technology and  production costs.5  Two  further developments 
of the last decades have contributed to the increased importance of an  analysis of international 
markets in  the  presence of regional  asymmetries with  respect to  market  conditions and  trade 
policy.  These developments could  be  labelled  globalization and  regionalization,  respectively.6 
Globalization denotes the  process of increasing international integration of markets due to  the 
reduction of real  and  institutional  costs of trade in  goods,  factors  of production, technologies 
and  information.  However,  at  the  same  period,  trade  policy  has  become  more  and  more 
regionally oriented.  For example,  trade policies of the EU and  NAFT A affect  about  60% of 
world trade. 
In the presence of regional asymmetries, national industries will either be market leaders 
or be lagging behind  in  the international market place in  terms of their product qualities.  The 
1  See e.g. Bresnahan (1989). 
2See e.g. BranderiKrugman (1983). 
3Sec Mintz (1973), Le\'insohn (1988), Fccnstra (1988,  1993), Menzlcr-Hokkanen (1994). 
4Regional asymmetries witl. respect to production costs can also be the result of  differences in factor 
endo\\ments. 
5 See e.g. CabralcslMotta (1995), Mottarrhisse/Cabrales (1995). 
6Baldwin/Vcnables (1994). 2 
resulting asymmetry in profits creates powerful incentives for lagging industries as well as their 
national governments to reverse this situation to their advantage, i.e.  to induce "Leapfrogging" 
in terms of product qualities.  This switch in  competitive stance can, e.g., be induced by direct 
foreign  investment into backward industries (East Germany,  transformation economies) or by 
government  measures  such  as  subsidies,  quotas  or standards.  Even  trade  liberalization  has 
similar effects in certain circumstances.  Examples of Leapfrogging-oriented trade policies are 
found  in  public  programs  that  involve  subsidizing  research  and  development  (R&D)  in 
European  value-added  industries.  The  EU  Commission  has  established  a  program  that 
subsidizes  R&D  joint  ventures  in  telecom  and  information  technologies  (SPRIT).  More 
examples are found in the EU's environment, marine and biological programs, respectively. 
The  conceptual  economic  framework  that  explicitly  includes  quality  aspects  and 
regional asymmetries into the analysis is provided by models of  vertical product differentiation. 
Product differentiation entails an additional strategic choice in form  of an investment in quality 
(R&D,  human and technological capital) prior to  the final  product market competition.  These 
models are  also  particularly  useful  for  the  analysis  of trade  policies  and  Leapfrogging.  This 
paper  presents  an  overview  of existing  research  on  vertical  product  differentiation  and 
Leapfrogging as well as several new results and questions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Sections 2 and  3 present the basic 
analytical  framework  and  some  main  results  about  market  behavior.  Section  4  presents 
theoreticfil  arguments  for  Leapfrogging  induced  by  production  subsidies,  quality  standards, 
quotas,  tariffs,  and  trade liberalization.  Section  5 discusses  the  significance  of different  cost 
specifications and  market  conditions.  Section 6 surveys  some  empirical  evidence  on  quality 
differentiation and market structure.  Section 7 concludes. 
2.  The Theoretical Framework 
Most of the  theoretical  results  presented  in  this  paper  have  been  derived  by  utilizing 
some specific model  out of the  class of models of imperfect competition and  vertical  product 
quality  differentiation.  In  this  section,  we  introduce  one  benchmark  model  that  has  been 
extensively applied in the literature.  The consequences of altering specific significant features, 3 
such as form  of competition or cost structures, are discussed later.  Our benchmark analytical 
framework utilizes a two-country model of imperfect competition.  This allows for the analysis 
of effects of various national  and  international  economic  policy measures on  national welfare, 
industry profits and consumers' welfare in more than one country.  The analysis captures some 
of  the most important aspects of  international markets. 
The effects of trade policy on product quality have been investigated since the mid-70s 
but  earlier  studies  are  restricted  to  the  cases  of perfect  competition  or  monopolyJ  Other 
studies  take  oligopolistic  competition  into  account  but  assume  exogenously  fixed  product 
qualities. 8  The standard  model  of duopolistic competition with  endogenous product  qualities 
has  been  developed  since  the  beginning  of the  80s  (Mussa/Rosen  1978,  GabszewiczlThisse 
1979,  Shaked/Sutton  1982,  Champsaur/Rochet  1989,  Ronnen  1991)9.  Consumers  have 
identical preferences and  different incomes.  The  income differences lead  to differences in  the 
willingness  to  pay  for  a particular  product  quality.  Two  firms  offer  products  of different 
qualities  in  two (domestic and  foreign)  markets.  The  firms  bear quality-dependent costs and 
compete  in  qualities  and  prices  in  a  two-stage  industry  game.  Since  higher  product 
differentiation  reduces  substitutability  and  price  competition,  even  identical  firms  will  offer 
distinct  qualities  in  the  resulting  market  equilibrium.  Trade will  take  place  since  both  firms 
operate in  both markets (reciprocal-dumping argument).  National governments can  use trade 
policy to improve the strategic position of domestic industries (see e.g.  Brander/Spencer 1984, 
Krishna  1989).  There  is  also  the  possibility  of strategic  noncooperative  interaction  between 
two national governments. 
The point  of departure or benchmark case  for  the following  discussion  is  a particular 
model  labelled  for  this  purpose  as  Type  A.  The  Type-A  model  represents  consumers  by  a 
uniform distribution of  an income parameter in the interval [0, t].  In addition, production costs 
consist exclusively of quality-dependent convex fixed  costs, i.e.  marginal costs (with respect to 
quantity)  are  constant  (equal  to  zero).  Type  A obtains  market  equilibria  with  incomplete 
market coverage (not  all  consumers buy).  Without  other entry costs,  the  number  of firms  in 
7  See Spcncc (1975), Rodrigucz (1979), FaJvey (1979), SanlonilVan Colt (1980), Mayer (1982), 
DaslDonnenfcld (1987), Krishna (1987), Bond (1988). 
8See e.g. Leland (1979), Shapiro (1983) 
9For an overyiew, see Tirole (1988) or Waterson (1989). 4 
the market is unlimited (no Finiteness Property).  Furthermore, the profits of  the firm  providing 
the higher quality are higher than the profits of  the other firm. 
3. Some Basic Theoretical Results 
In  duopolistic  models  of vertical  product  differentiation,  there  generally  exist  two 
equilibria (in pure strategies) since a priori  either firm  can  decide to offer either the higher or 
the lower quality.  With  identical firms,  the two equilibria are  essentially (up  to the  order of 
firms)  identical.  Therefore, most of the previous work is  restricted to marginal  analysis  in  the 
vicinity of one of these equilibria (e.g.  Ronnen  1991, Motta 1992,  1993,  Cremer/Thisse  1994, 
Boom  1995).  Other  studies  apply  marginal  analysis  also  to  the  second  equilibrium  (e.g. 
CrampeslHollander 1995, MottalThisselCabrales 1995). 
The  existence of regional  asymmetries  (especially with  respect to  cost of quality)  can 
lead to the existence of only one equilibrium.  This effect can  also be attained by various trade 
policies( e.g.  subsidies, tariffs,  quality standards).  This provides powerful incentives for the use 
of trade  policy  in  the  case  where  the  domestic  industry  is  initially  in  the  position  leading  to 
lower profits.  This  is  especially  the  case  for  the  Type-A  model.  For the  analysis  of these 
cases, a complete description of firms  profit-maximizing strategies (quality best responses) and 
the resulting  multiple  equilibria  is  crucial.  This  is  the case,  since the effects of various  trade 
policy instruments  are  not  always  marginal  (with  respect  to  one  initial  equilibrium).  On  the 
contrary, trade policy can induce a switch from  an  initial equilibrium to another equilibrium.  In 
the case of vertical product differentiation, this switch means that the firm  initially offering the 
qualitatively  inferior  product  ends  up  producing  the  qualitatively  superior  product 
(qualitativeltechnological Leapfrogging).  This effect can be caused also, for example, by direct 
foreign investment in backward industries, industry-specific subsidies, or regional investment in 
infrastructure. 
In  describing  firms'  profit-maximizing  strategic  responses,  the  cases  of  quantity 
(Cournot) and  price  (Bertrand)  competition  need  to  be  distinguished  since  they  affect  firms' 
profits  differently. ID  Under  Bertrand  competition,  a  firm's  profit  functions  consist  of two 
lOThis description offirm's quality best responses is based on Aoki (1995) and Lutz (l996c). 5 
strictly  concave  segments  connecting  at  the  quality  level  of the  competitor  (see  Figure  1). 
Each of  these segments contains a local profit maximum, leaving the firm to decide whether to 
choose the low-quality or the high-quality maximum.  If the competitor's quality rises, then the 
low-quality segment of the  profit function  rises  and  the high-quality segment falls  making the 
low-quality choice more attractive.  This gives rise to a quality best response where both firms 
set  their  qualities  as  strategic  complements  (see  Figure  2).  Profits  along  this  quality  best 
response are as follows:  With a competitor's quality close to zero, a firm will set a high quality 
making close to monopoly profits.  As the competitor's quality rises, the firm's profits decrease 
as long as it provides the higher quality.  Eventually it will be more profitable to provide lower 
quality.  From then on,  profits increase with  an  increase  in  the competitor's quality.  With two 
identical  firms  i and  j that  set  qualities  Si  and  Sj,  this  gives  rise  to  a situation  as  depicted  in 
Figure  3,  where  the  intersections  of the  best  responses  indicate  two  asymmetric  equilibria. 
Generally, there will be two  pure-strategy equilibria as long as  firms  are not too different with 
respect to  cost of providing quality.  The  ratio  of high  quality to low quality  is  constant with 
respect to market size but  increases monotonically  in  the  ratio  of cost  parameters of the two 
firms.  The existence of a unique quality equilibrium  due to  cost differences can  be  illustrated 
using Figure 3.  In Figure 3,  an increase in the fix cost of  firm j would lead to a leftward shift in 
qbrj.  If this increase gets sufficiently large,  the  intersection of qbrj and  qbrj  in  the lower right 
corner of Figure 3 vanishes.  Only one equilibrium with  firm  i providing high  quality remains. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4. 
While  the  existence  of Cournot  versus  Bertrand  competition  does  not  affect  the 
qualitative  market  outcome  much  without  regulation  or  trade  policy,  there  is  a variety  of 
evidence for some significance of market conduct in the  presence of such  policies.
11  Cournot-
conduct  entails  a lower  degree  of price  competition  than  Bertrand-conduct.  Generally,  this 
leads to higher quality differentiation  and  profits  in  the former case.  Profits,  however,  are  a 
key variable for the analysis of entry, exit and Leapfrogging.  Furthermore, with Cournot-con-
duct, qualities are not  generally strategic complements any more.  In the case of the duopoly, 
11  Direct comparisuns ha\'e been forwarded, for example, by Motta (1993), Aoki  (1995) and 
HergueralKujallPetrakis (1996.  199.t).  The case of trade policy in the presence of price competition has been 
treated, for example, by Krishna (1987.  1989), Cremerffhisse (1994) and Boom (1995), while the case of 
quantity competition was analyzed. for example, by DasfPonnenfeld (1989). 6 
the higher quality will be set as a strategic complement whereas the lower quality will  be set as 
a strategic  substitute.  This  is  potentiaJly  significant with  respect  to  any  policy  that  directly 
changes the shape of quality best responses (e.g.  quality standards).  However,  in  many  cases 
market results will be very similar.  In the following sections, we will discuss differences where 
appropriate. 
Furthermore, policies such as  quality  standards enable  one  firm  to  prevent  exit  of the 
competitor although the firm  lacks this ability  in  the  unregulated  market  equilibrium  (without 
additional  fixed  entry costs) (Lutz  1996b).  This  effect  can  also  be  present  for  various  other 
trade  policies.  Section  4.2.  below  contains  a case  (HergueralLutz  1996a)  where  a  quality 
standards leads to Leapfrogging and exit of  one firm. 12 
4. Policies that Facilitate Leapfrogging 
The  possibility  of Leapfrogging  arises  generaJly  when  a policy  changes  an  industry'S 
potential profits as  the high-quality provider relative to  its  profits as  the low-quality provider. 
It follows  that  a general  analysis  of Leapfrogging necessitates the  analysis  of firms'  strategic 
best responses and profits.  The intersection of two firm's  quality best responses constitutes a 
(pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium in  qualities.  As already outlined  in  Section 3,  the  number as 
well  as  the  locations  of the  equilibria  are  determined  by  the  relative  locations  of the  best 
responses,  which  in  turn  are  determined  by  market  factors,  cost  factors,  and  (trade)  policies 
applied.  In  particular,  any  policy that shifts the  quality best response of a firm  may  lead  to  a 
switch from  one equilibrium to another.  One  particular policy of this  kind  is  a production or 
R&D  subsidy,  another one is  an  ad-valorem tariff.  Both policies  directly  change the cost of 
providing  a  certain  level  of quality.  Other  policies  such  as  quality  standards,  quantity 
constraints or specific tariffs affect firms'  quality best responses in  a much less straight-forward 
way.  They  may  lead  to  Leapfrogging  in  certain  circumstances,  but  their  analysis  is  more 
complicated.  Since the literature on  Leapfrogging  is  rather fragmentary  at  this  time,  we will 
often restrict the discussion to presentations of certain benchmark cases or examples.  In what 
12 Earlier work on entry (e.g. Donnenfc1dJWebcr 1992, Hung/Schmitt 1992) concentrates on cases where fixed 
entry costs are present. 7 
follows,  we  will  discuss  R&D  or  production  subsidies,  mmmmm  quality  standards,  trade 
liberalization, tariffs, and quantitative trade restrictions. 
4.1. R&D or Production Subsidies 
This case is discussed concentrating on Bertrand competition in the second stage of  the 
industry  game,  since  the  qualitative  results  will  be  the  same  for  the  case  of Cournot 
competition.  Even  though  the  analysis  of Leapfrogging  in  a vertical  product  differentiation 
framework  has  recently  been  addressed  by  authors  such  as  HergueralKujallPetrakis  (1994), 
Lutz (1996b),  and  MottalThisse/Cabrales  (1995),  there  is  hardly  any  literature  covering  the 
usage  of R&D  subsidies  to  induce  Leapfrogging.13  The  analysis  presented  here  is  from 
HergueralLutz (1996b). 
As  outlined  in  Section  3,  Bertrand  competition  will  lead  to  a quality  best  responses 
where  both  firms  set  their  qualities  as  strategic  complements  (as  in  Figure  2).  With  two 
identical  firms  i and  j that  set  qualities  Si  and  Sj,  this  gives  rise  to  a situation  as  depicted  in 
Figure 3  and  there will  be  two  pure-strategy  equilibria  as  long  as  firms  are  not  too  different 
with respect to cost of providing quality.  The  ratio  of high  quality to  low quality  is  constant 
with respect to market  size but  increases  monotonically  in  the  ratio  of cost parameters of the 
two  firms.  The  existence  of a  unique  quality  equilibrium  due  to  cost  differences  can  be 
illustrated using Figures 3 and 4.  In Figure 3, an increase in the fix cost of  firm j would lead to 
a leftward shift in qbrj'  If this increase gets sufficiently large,  the intersection of qbfj  and  qbrj 
in the lower right corner of Figure 3 vanishes,  Only one equilibrium with firm  i providing high 
quality remains.  This is shown in Figure 4. 
This  case  starts  from  an  initial  situation  with  identical  firms,  where  one  is  domestic 
(firm i) and the other is foreign and both are acting in the domestic market.  It is assumed that 
the  domestic  firm  is  initially  offering  the  lower  quality,  providing  the  motive  for  a 
Leapfrogging-inducing policy by the domestic government.  This  initial  situation could  be  the 
outcome of the  foreign  firm  being  longer  in  the  market  than  the  domestic  firm,  so  that  the 
foreign  firm  operated  as  a Stackelberg-Ieader  towards  the  domestic  firm  in  the  past.  The 
130ther issues related to R&D are treated,e,g., by Motta (1991), LeahfINeary (l995a, 1995b). 8 
analysis  shows  that  an  R&D  subsidy  can  be  found  that  leads  to  a  reversal  of the  quality 
ordering in equilibrium and increases domestic profits as well  as domestic welfare (measured as 
the sum of  consumer surplus and profits minus subsidy cost). 
However, it cannot be generally argued for the application of such policies, even though 
this case entails welfare increases for the domestic country.  Since strategic interaction between 
governments will  likely take the form  of a subsidy race leading to  a prisoner's  dilemma,  this 
analysis merely suggests that policy makers should be aware of the possibility of rather radical 
effects ofR&D subsidies. 
4.2. Minimum Quality Standards 
Ronnen  (1991)  uses  Shaked  and  Sutton's  framework  to  demonstrate  cases  where 
quality standards improve welfare.  He  concludes that  there exists a binding minimum  quality 
standard such that  all  consumers are  weakly  better off,  both  firms  have  positive  profits,  and 
total welfare is  increased.  As  a result  of such  a standard,  profits of the  high-quality provider 
must fall,  whereas profits of the low-quality provider may even  rise if the standard is set  close 
to the equilibrium level of  low quality without regulation.
14  Crampes/Hollander (I 995) present 
a study where  quality  improvements  fall  on  variable  costs.  They  present  results  where  all 
consumers  lose  through  the  imposition  of a  standard.  Boom  (1995)  introduces  National 
Treatment of standards into a two-country model.  Here, a relatively high  standard imposed in 
one country can lead to market exit and a reduction of product variety in one country reducing 
consumers'  welfare.  Lutz  (1996a,  J996b,  1996c)  analyzes  standards  under  Mutual 
Recognition.  Here, each government maximizes  regional  welfare subject to its own standard. 
Now both firms  face  binding  standards  and  are  forced  to  increase  quality.  This  leads  to  a 
14Ronnen starts from the assumption that the chosen order of qualities is already determined, i.e.  it is a priori 
clear which of the firms ofTers the higher quality.  Consequently. Ronnen analyzed firms quality best responses 
only in the vicinity of one existing equilibrium.  Howe\'er, with completely endogenous choice of quality. there 
exist up to two equilibria and each finn's quality best response is discontinuous and contains a high- and a low-
quality branch. respectively.  In our paper. we demonstrate the derivation of complete quality bcst responses and 
the resulting equilibria.  These equilibria are in pure strategies.  If there are two pure-strategy equilibria, there 
also exists at least onc mixed-strategy equilibrium.  Howcver, thc analysis of mixed-strategy cquilibria is 
beyond the scope of this work.  The emerger.ce of multiple equilibria has also been acknowledged by, e.g., 
Boom (1995) or Crampesl Hollander (1995).  The  question of selection between two asymmetric equilibria was 
recently addressed by Mottaffhissc/Cabrales (1995) who demonstrate how the risk dominance criterion can be 
utilized for this purpose in models of the type employed here. 9 
higher degree of product differentiation than with a single standard.  However, since costs are 
convex in  quality,  the government  regulating  the  low-quality  provider  prefers  to  increase its 
industry's quality more than the other government.  Therefore,  quality differentiation is  lower 
than without regulation.  In  addition,  each  region  benefits  from  an  increase  in  quality of the 
other region's  product.  Introducing quality  standards  will  increase  both  qualities,  reduce the 
ratio  of qualities,  reduce  both  national  industries'  profits,  increase  national  welfare  in  both 
regions, and reduce the rati9 of  national welfares. 
The effects of quality  standards  on  industry competition are  primarily  driven  by  their 
influence on  price competition and  the  qualities  produced.  Due  to  the  duopoly  situation and 
the nature of price and quality coi11petition,  an unregulated equilibrium results in qualities being 
too low,  prices being  too  high  and  quality  differentiation  being  too low when  compared  to  a 
welfare-maximizing solution.  When qualities produced become more similar, price competition 
intensifies.  In  response to  quality  standards,  qualities  rise,  quality  differentiation  is  reduced, 
and  prices  adjusted  for  quality  fall.  In  the  case  of a single  standard,  only  the  low-quality 
provider is constrained.  High quality rises also because qualities are strategic complements due 
to the effect  of quality  differentiation  on  price  competition.  Reduced  quality  differentiation 
results because increasing quality is increasingly costly. 
Even  though  the  analysis  of  Leapfrogging  111  a  vertical  product  differentiation 
framework has recently been  addressed  in  the  literature (see  Section 4.2.), there is  hardly  any 
literature covering the usage of standards to induce Leapfrogging.  The example presented here 
is from HergueralLutz (1996a).  A more efficient domestic firm  and a less efficient foreign firm 
operate in a single domestic market.  The foreign  firm  initially produces and  sells a product of 
higher quality.  (This initial  situation could  be the  outcome of the  foreign  firm  being longer in 
the market  than  the  domestic  firm,  so  that  the  foreign  firm  operated  as  a Stackelberg-Ieader 
towards the domestic firm  in  the past.)  Since the domestic firm  could  make higher profits by 
offering the higher quality,  there  is  an  incentive for  the domestic government  to  facilitate  this 
outcome by  some  policy.  In  the  absence  of a facilitating  policy,  however,  the  domestic  firm 
cannot credibly leapfrog, since the current outcome represents a Nash-equilibrium.  It  is shown 
that the domestic government can  choose a standard such  that  the  domestic  firm:  (1)  cannot 10 
have nonnegative profits as the low-quality firm;  and (2) can set a quality such that the foreign 
firm  cannot have nonnegative profits as either the low-quality or the high-quality firm;  and (3) 
domestic welfare is  increased.  Hence,  the standard facilitates  Leapfrogging as  well  as  exit  of 
the foreign competitor.  This result depends cmcially on the cost asymmetry between domestic 
and  foreign  producers.  Hence,  the  purpose  of this  analysis  is  to  illustrate  that  domestic 
standards  can  have  strategic  trade  effects  that  are  not  marginal  but  entail  a  complete 
restructuring of the international market  in  question.  Here,  a standard that  is  nonbinding for 
the foreign firm  ultimately leads to the exit  (or non-entry) of the foreign  firm.  This  standard 
also enables the domestic firm  to  act  exactly like a monopolist  without the threat of entry.  In 
doing this,  the domestic firm  chooses a quality that  is  not  bound  by  the standard,  higher than 
the quality  it  would  have  chosen  without  a standard,  and  higher  than  the  quality  the  foreign 
firm would have chosen without the standard (potential "Leapfrogging"). 
However, it cannot be generally argued for the application of such policies, even though 
this  case  entails  welfare  increases  for  the  domestic  country.  Since  several  examples  can  be 
constmcted where the outcomes are quite different,  this suggests that  policy makers should be 
aware of  the possibility of rather radical and detrimental effects of domestic standards. 
4.3. Trade Liberalization 
MottalThisselCabrales  (1995)  investigate  whether  the  openmg  of trade  will  lead  to 
persistence of  an initial quality leadership caused by national  differences in  demand.  Countries 
operate under autarchy in  the first  period, whereas trade occurs in  the second.  They conclude 
that  persistence  of leadership  is  most  likely  to  result.  This  is  the  only  possible  outcome  if 
differences in national demand  are very large.  In  all  other cases, i.e.  when multiple equilibria 
exist, using the risk dominance criterionl5 leads to the selection of  the persistence-of-Ieadership 
outcome.  Initial  leadership  without  trade,  i.e.  under  autarky,  is  the  result  of one  country 
having  a bigger  market  than  the  other.  This  leads  to  quality  choices  where  the  firm  in  the 
bigger country offers a higher quality even  though  firms  are  identical.  When  trade  is  opened 
between both  countries  and  firms  can  adjust  their  qualities  accordingly  (bearing  adjustment 
15Looscly speaking, the risk dominance criterion means that firms evaluate the risk of ending up in the "wrong 
equilibrium" when choosing their strategies. 11 
costs), the possibility arises for the firm  offering the lower quality  in  autarky to now offer the 
higher quality  in  the joint market.  This  constitutes a case  of Leapfrogging induced  by  trade 
liberalization. This is, however, only possible if country sizes are not to different.  Furthermore, 
if both  firms  use  the  risk  dominance  criterion  to  select  their  strategies,  Leapfrogging  will 
generally not arise. 
This  indicates  that  trade  liberalization  by  itself  is  typically  unlikely  to  lead  to 
Leapfrogging.  However,  since  the  possibility  of Leapfrogging  is  introduced  by  trade 
liberalization, this might influence the timing of other Leapfrogging-inducing policies. 
4.4. Tariffs 
Tariffs and  quotas have been widely analyzed  as  protection instruments in  international 
trade.  The  main  argument  for  tariff protection  in  imperfectly  competitive  markets  was  put 
forward  by  Brander/Spencer  (1984).  In  a duo poly,  they  argued,  with  one  foreign  and  one 
domestic firm,  the domestic government has incentives to impose a tariff on the foreign imports 
since it  gains  via  three channels:  it  improves  the terms of trade,  it  gains tariff revenues  and  it 
provides a strategic advantage to  the  domestic  firm  via  an  increase  in  its  market  share at  the 
expense  of the  foreign  competitor.  When  firms  compete  also  in  the  long  run  in  R&D 
investments  that  may  lead  to  higher  quality  of the  products  on  the  market,  tariffs  may  have 
important effects not only on the product market but also  on the previous R&D optimal choice 
by each firm. 
If there is  a monopoly Krishna  (1987) showed  that  a specific tariff increases the price-
quality ratio of the high quality good less than the ratio of the low quality good. Since demand 
for  each  variety  is  inversely  related  to  its  price  the  total  demand  for  the  high  quality  good 
increases.  The  observed  effect  of the  trade policy  is  an  upgrading of the average quality.  The 
ad  valorem  tariff has  ambiguous  effects  on  the  quality  offered  in  monopoly  or  leaves  the 
qualities  unaffected  in  perfect  competition,  as  in  Rodriguez  (1979)  or  Santoni/Van  Cott 
(1980). 12 
In oligopoly the effect of a specific tariff on the imported high  quality good depends on 
the  credibility  of the  government  announcement 16  and  on  the  existence  of set  up  costs  of 
quality. Reitzes (1992) points out that if significant set up  costs exist, then the tariff induces a 
suboptimal choice of  quality on the part of the foreign  firm.  Furthermore, a high enough tariff 
protection may  induce the domestic firm  to  achieve  the  first  best  quality  choice.  This  is  best 
explained as a coordination problem: when  high  fixed  costs,  no  firm  has  incentives to commit 
to large investments unless  a protection instrument guarantees that a sufficiently large market 
share will be enjoyed in the final  products market.  This  can be achieved for the domestic firm 
if  protected by a tariff. 
If  the tariff announced is  credible, there is  an  interval of tariffs (i.e., the non-prohibitive 
tariffs)  that  lead  to  quality  downgrading  on  the  part  of the  high  quality  foreign  firm  and  to 
upgrading for  the low-quality  domestic  firm.  The  tariff will  reduce  the  market  share  of the 
foreign  firm  and  increase  the  market  share  of the  domestic  firm.17  This  leads  to  quality 
downgrading  (upgrading)  by  the  foreign  (domestic)  firm,  since  fixed  costs  of quality  are 
distributed  across  less  (more)  output.  More  importantly,  if  firms  do  not  believe  the 
government announced tariff, the foreign firm  will expect a high enough tariff that will  provoke 
Leapfrogging  and  this  induces  the  foreign  firm  to  produce  a  lower  quality  than  the  rival
18
. 
Since the government gains  by  placing  the domestic  firm  in  the  upper segment  of the  quality 
ladder,  the home  firm  will  produce the  high  quality  good.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  a 
partial  one  country  equilibrium  setting,  the  domestic  government  is  better  off  by  not 
committing to a specific tariff, since it can provoke Leapfrogging with a low ex-post tariff rate. 
4.5. Quantitative Trade Restrictions 
In perfect competition, first  Falvey (1979) and  Swan (1970) showed that a quantitative 
restriction  on  trade  would  lead  to  quality  upgrading  on  the  part  of  a  multi-product 
monopolists.  The  quota  places  a shadow  price  on  any  unit  of the  high- or the  low  quality 
goods.  Any  increase  in  the  quality  of any  of the  goods  reduces  the  shadow  price  of the 
16To the problem of credibility, compare also Lcahy/Neary (1994). 
t~This is essentially the same eITcct as in Brander/Spencer (1984). 
See HcrgucraIKuja IlPctrakis (1996). 13 
restriction.  Hence,  raising quality as  a response to  the quantitative restriction is  profitable for 
the monopolist  assuming  that  the  marginal  consumer values  quality  increments  less  than  the 
average consumer does.  For the case of a monopolist serving a destination market,  in  a model 
of endogenous quality choice the  effects of quotas  in  the  product  line  of a monopolists have 
been studied l9.  In this vertical  product differentiation model,  quality  is  a factor that  raises the 
willingness to pay for  any given output.  Depending on the rationing rule implied by the quota 
the marginal consumers left out after the quota may be the high valuation or the low valuation 
consumers.  If only  the  low  valuation  marginal  consumer  is  expelled  of the  market  after  the 
quantitative  restriction  then  the  monopolist  raises  the  average  quality  of the  products  as  a 
response.  In  what  folIows,  we  discuss  to  what  extent  the  result  of quality-upgrading  holds 
when there is strategic interaction among several firms. 
For the case of oligopoly the theoretical and empirical results are more complex.  A very 
important  distinction  comes  regarding  the  timing  and  credibility  of  the  trade  policy 
announcement.  When  the  announcement  of the  quantitative  restriction  is  credible  and  firms 
simultaneously choose the quality and  the quantity of the good,  the quotas may lead to  quality 
upgrading  depending  on  the  initial  location  of the  firms  in  the  quality  ladder.  If the  foreign 
(restricted)  firm  is  the  high  quality  producer,  after  the  quota  is  imposed  it  will  increase  the 
quality  attached  to  its  good  since  total  sales  in  the  market  decrease  and  marginal  revenue  is 
increasing in the quality.  The high valuation consumers are willing to  pay an  increasing price if 
the  quality  offered  is  higher.  The  foreign  firm  quality  response  wiII  be  opposite  if it  starts 
producing the low quality good, whereas the domestic firm  responds to  a quota by  increasing 
its  quality  if it  produces  the  low  quality  initially  or by  downgrading  if it  produces  the  high 
quality initially2°. The driving force of these results lies in what Krishna points out  as the quota 
as a "facilitating device"  tending to  reduce the  amount  of competition.  In  fact  the facilitating 
practice result is very important since,  depending  on the timing of moves by  the  firms,  it  may 
lead to the opposite result,  i.e.,  quality  downgrading,  by  both firms  in  the  market.  We  can 
think of  the quality, or R&D investment,  as a choice made for the long run,  while the quantity 
~~see  Krishna (1987), Spcnce (1976). 
See DaslDonnenfc1d (1987) , Krishna (1983) , Harris (1986) and Rics (1993). 14 
(or price) competition takes place in  the short run
21
.  In  this setting the quality choice is a sunk 
investment  for  the  firms  in  the  short  run.  The  quantitative  restriction  may  lead  to  quality 
downgrading by both firms.  The reason is,  that the domestic firm  may choose not to compete 
aggressively in  the quality stage since  it  knows the foreign  firm  is  restricted.  This facilitating 
practice that occurs in the last stage may also feed  back into the R&D or quality stage. If  firms 
believe in  the government policy announcement they  will  not  invest  as  much  in  the  quality of 
the goods to be delivered as they would under free trade since both know that market sales will 
be restricted in the last period. 
The quota may  lead  also  to Leapfrogging.  A quota set  close to the free trade level  of 
exchange will  not  induce  any Leapfrogging,  although  it  leads  to  small  changes  in  the  quality 
choices.  There are,  however,  positive quota levels  such  that  the initially  high-quality foreign 
producer finds  it  no  longer profitable to  maintain  its  previous level  of quality since the market 
share  it  will  enjoy  in  the  products  market  is  expected  to  be  too  small.  If the  quota  level 
announcement by the government is not credible the foreign  firm  expects precisely that level of 
quota  to  be  implemented  ex-post  by  the  government  and  advancing  it,  it  may  decide  to 
downgrade the quality of its products even below the quality offered by the domestic rival.  It  is 
important to note that in this idealized framework with only two competing firms,  the domestic 
government  achieves  a Pareto  improvement  if it  provokes  the  Leapfrogging.  Profits  for  the 
firms are increasing in  the quality segment and consumer surplus, even if total sales are reduced 
by the quota,  increases due to  the higher  surplus derived  from  the  high  quality  consumers22. 
Trade policy can  cause a discontinuous  change  in  the  behavior of the  firms  in  the  quality  as 
well as in the quantity (or price) dimension. It is also  possible to combine a policy mix ofR&D 
subsidies together with  specific tariffs  or quotas  in  order to  achieve  the Leapfrogging23. At 
this point  it  is  very important to  note that because of the  presence of sunk or set-up costs of 
quality  in  the  first  stage,  we  can  conclude  that  credibility  is  not  an  important  asset  for  the 
domestic government. Clearly,  if no  sunk costs of quality exist,  then  no  matter at  what  stage 
the government announces the  policy,  the  quality  choices will  be  optimal  (first  best).  If the 
~~AS  in HcrgueraIKujallPetrakis (1994). 
23As is shown in HcrgueralKujallPetrakis (1996). 
As in HcrgucraIKujallPctrakis (1996). 15 
government announces the tariff or quota level after the qualities have been chosen, then  it can 
extract all the rents from the foreign firm  because the foreign  firm  does not have the possibility 
to react.  As noted by Reitzes (1992) and  HergueralKujallPetrakis (1996), it  is the presence of 
sunk  costs  of quality  in  the  sequential  game  that  makes  commitment  on  the  part  of the 
Government important for the competitors. 
Credibility  of  the  government  is  not  desirable  in  this  one-country  equilibrium 
framework since the government gains  by provoking Leapfrogging and  it  achieves this with a 
Iow ex-post tariff or quota  level.  In  this  setting,  firms  can  also  strategically manipulate their 
quality choices in  order to  influence the  resulting level  of protection.  The domestic firm  may 
locate  in  the  Iow-quality  segment  in  order  to  achieve  a  higher  protection  level  from  the 
domestic government because it wants to induce Leapfrogging24 
In a more general setting with several countries, of course, all  countries would face the 
same incentives to  use  quantitative restrictions  to induce  Leapfrogging,  leading once again  to 
the danger of an inefficient outcome. 
5. DifTerences in Cost Specifications and Market Structure 
The cost structure in combination with assumptions about the distribution of  consumers 
determines the structure of firms'  profits  in  equilibrium.  The  Type-A  model  leads  to  identical 
rankings of qualities and  firms'  profits,  respectively.  Changes of product qualities  induced  by 
trade policy that lead to lower product differentiation will generally reduce profits of both firms 
but  increase their market  shares.  This  is  possible  since  market  coverage  is  increased  by  this 
policy  (absolutely  more  consumers  purchase  products)  (Ronnen  1991,  Lutz  1993).  The 
ranking  of firms'  profits,  however,  remains  unchanged.  However,  if the  market  is  covered 
already in  unregulated  equilibria  (see  Shaked/Sutton  1982 for  the  appropriate condition),  the 
same policy will  lead to  an  increase of the market share of the low-quality firm  and  a decrease 
of the  market  share  of the  high-quality  firm  (Boom  1995,  CrampeslHollander  1995). 
Furthermore,  in  the  Type-A  model.  the  high-quality  firm  can  increase  its  market  share  by 
24 Another reason for quantitatiyc restrictions is when therc are informational externalities in the consumption 
of the goods. In this case the informational cxternality may lead to suboptimallevcls of quality chosen by all the 
competitors. The Government may upgradc thc averagc quality in thc market and to achieve this it may set 
quantitative restrictions at thc individuallevcl.  See DonnenfcldIMayer (1987). 16 
lowering price without increasing total cost.  This possibility is greatly reduced in  the presence 
of variable  costs.  As  a result,  the  case  of market  coverage  and  variable  costs  quadratic  in 
quality leads to identical  profits  and  market  shares for  both firms  (CrampeslHollander  1995). 
This means that the choice of  higher quality does not any more entail a strategic advantage for 
the respective  firm.  Moreover,  trade policy  will  now  lead  to  overproportional  losses  of the 
high-quality firm.  In summary,  it  can be  concluded that the effects of trade policy are highly 
dependent  on  assumptions about  costs and  demand  structure.  More comparative analysis  in 
this area will be necessary to adequadely assess the robustness of any policy analysis presented. 
6. Empirical Evidence 
Empirical evidence on Leapfrogging or even on vertical quality differentiation is mostly 
anectodal or based on case studies.  In many cases, it also takes the form of analyses of  general 
conditions  in  developing  countries.  Some  of these  studies  cover  the  computer  industry  in 
Eastern Europe (Bodea  1994),  telecommunications  in  developing  countries (Antonelli  1991), 
the Brazilian information technology industry (Bornstein  1995), the East-Asian semiconductor 
industry (Hong 1993), or technical cooperation with developing countries (Brinkerhoff (1990). 
Direct empirical applications of models of vertical  product differentiation are currently 
virtually non-existent (exceptions are, e.g., Messinger 1989 or Thomas 1988).  This is probably 
due to  two  main  reasons.  The  first  is  the  (afore mentioned)  lack  of robustness of theoretical 
results.  The  second  is  the  general  problem  of  quality  measurement.  Studies  about 
measurement  of quality  have  been  forwarded  by  Feenstra  (1988,  1993),  Greenaway  (1984), 
Levinsohn (1988), Menzler-Hokkanen (1994).  Provided that appropriate quality indices were 
available,  empirical  industry  models  of vertical  quality  differentiation  using  any  particular 
quality measure might be constructed similarly to the way models of horizontal (or unspecified) 
quality  differentiation  have  been  constructed  (compare,  e.g.,  Dixit  1988, 
GasioreklSmith/Venables  1992,  Smith/Venables  1988).  However,  this  has  not  been  done yet 
(to our knowledge). 
In summary, the available empirical evidence suggests that Leapfrogging is an especially 
relevant phenomenon for developing and transformation economies. 17 
7.  Conclusions 
The  purpose  of this  paper  was  to  present  an  overview  of existing  literature  on 
Leapfrogging.  The  research  discussed  suggest  that  several  domestic  policies  might  have 
strategic  trade  effects  that  are  not  marginal  but  entail  a  complete  restructuring  of the 
international market in  question.  These policies  do  not  only  include traditional  trade policies 
such  as  tariffs  and  quantitative trade  restrictions  but  also  others  such  as  R&D  subsidies  and 
quality  standards.  Furthermore,  in  addition  to  Leapfrogging,  they  might  also  induce  exit  or 
entry deterence. 
However, we cannot generally conclude from  the research discussed that these policies 
should be applied, even though most  cases presented entail welfare increases for the domestic 
country.  Since  the  results  are  mostly  not  robust  with  respect  to  country  asymmetries  and 
market conduct,  this  rather suggests  that  policy  makers  should  be  aware of the  possibility  of 
rather  radical  and  detrimental  effects  of domestic  policies.  It  also  suggests  that  current 
theoretical  research  is  still  a  long  \vay  from  a  general  analysis  of Leapfrogging-inducing 
policies.  Hence,  it  is  not  too  surprising  that  the  state  of empirical  research  is  even  more 
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Appendix 
A.I.  The Model - Price (Bertrand) Competition 
There are  two  firms,  the  domestic  firm  d and  the  forcign  firm  f.  both  competing  in  the  domestic 
market.  If both  firms  rcmain  in  thc  market,  then  they  produce  distinct  goods,  sold  at  prices  Pd  and  Pf, 
respectively.  The two  products carl)' a single quality attribute dcnotcd by sd  and  sf.  rcspectively.  Either firm 
faces  production  costs  that  are  increasing,  convex  (quadratic)  functions  of quality,  the  exact  level  of which 
depending on quality choscn and a quality cost paramcter b.  Total costs offirm i are then: 
ci = bi Si2  (1) 
In the domestic market, there  is a continuum of consumcrs distributcd  uniformly over the interval  [0, 
T] with unit density.  Each consumer purchases at  most one unit  of cithcr firm  d's product or firm  rs product. 
The higher a consumcr's income paramcter t. thc highcr is  hcr (his)  rcscn'ation price.  Consumer t's  utility is 
given by equation (2) if good i is purchased.2)  Consumers who do not purchasc rccei\'e zcro utility. 
Ut=sit-Pi  (2) 
Firms d and fplay a two-stage game26.  In the first stage. firms dctcrmil1f qualities to bc produccd and 
incur costs ci (i = d, f).  In thc second stagc, firms choosc priccs simultancously.2 
Price Compctition 
To  solve  the  gamc.  consider  first  the  dcmand  faccd  by  thc  high-quality  and  low-qualit~frm, 
respcctively.  Let hand 0 stand for high and low quality.  rcspcctivcly.  Thcsc dcmands arc thcn gi\'cn by: 
gh  =T-C Ph -Po),  go  = Ph  -Po _&  (3) 
Sh-so  Sh-so  S,) 
Lct  i = h,  0:  Ict j  1::- i.  Thc  profit  function  for  firm  i is gi\'cn  by n  i = Pjqj(Pj.Pj.Si.Sj)  - Cj(si)'  Takcn 
both qualitics as givcn.  the pricc rcaction functions  in cach  markct  arc givcn as  thc solutions to  thc  first  ordcr 
conditions.  Solving thc rcsulting cquations for both prices. cquilibrium prices are thcn givcn as: 
(4) 
Note  that  for  all  sh  > so'  T >  th  >  to  > 0  will  hold.  i.e  ..  cquation  (4)  is  in  fact  an  unconstraincd  price 
equilibrium. 
Givcn  thc  pricc  cquil ibrium  dcpictcd  abO\·c.  dcmands  and  thus  profits  can  bc  cxprcssed  in  tcrms  of 
qualities.  For positi\'c qualitics Si  (i = h.  0). thcsc profit functions arc: 
n  =4T~Sh~(Sh-SO)_bs~  n  =T~Sh(Sh-Sa>So_bs2 
h  (4s
h 
-so)~  h  h·  0  (4s
h 
-sa>~  0  0 
(5) 
Similarly, consumer surplus29 can bc expresscd in thc following way: 
(6) 
~~ Consumers who do not purchase rccci\'e zcro utility. 
In this formulation, firm i not entering the markct  is cquinllcnt to  firm  i choosing Si  = O.  Thc cntry dccision 
~1  firms is made simultancously when choosing quality. 
To dcrh'e solutions. wc will  use the concept ofsubgamc-perfcct cquilibrium. computing thc solutions for each 
stage in re\'crse ordcr.  Both firms choose thcir rcspcctive product quality from  thc same intcrval/O. 0',).  The 
rcsulting market equilibria will includc somc consumcrs in thc lowcr scgmcnt of thc inten'al [0. TJ  not valuing 
~~ality cnough to buy any product.  This guarantecs an intc.rior solution o~thc  ~ric~ game.  . 
Let tll = (Ph - Po)/(sh - so) and to =  Po/so.  Consumcrs WIth t =  polso \\'Ill be mdIfTcrcnt bctwcen bu)'mg thc 
low-quality product and not buying at all.  Consumers with t = (Ph - Po)/(sh - So) will bc indiffercnt betwcen 
buying either the high-quality or the low-quality product.  Consumers with T ~  t > th will buy high quality, 
consumers with th > t > to will buy low quality. and consumcrs with t < polso will  not buy at all. 
29Consumer surplus is dcfined as {f(t*Sh - Ph)dt + Jct*so - Po)dt} wherc thc first intcgral goes from th to T and 
the second goes from to to th' 22 
Properties of the Revenue and Consumer Surplus Functions 
Let Ri denote firm i's revenue function.  Let hand 0 denote high and low quality, respectively. 
oRh  ~ 0;  oRo  ~ 0 for So  ::;  4sh;  oRh  <  0,  oRo  >  0; 
OSh  05
0  7  oSo  OSh 
02Rh  ~  02Rh 
::;  0;  o-Ro  o·  >  0: 
OSh
2  OS02  ::;,  OShOSo 
>  O. 
Let CSI (I = D, F) denote region I's consumer surplus function.  Finns' qualities are denoted by sh and 
So for high  and low quality, respectively. 
Qualitv Competition 
To derive the firms'  quality best responses. we  investigate each finn's profit function,  given  the  other 
firm's quality choice, and taking into account the behavior in  the price-setting subgame.  Given  the order of 
qualities,  the profit functions  in  equations  (5)  are concm'e  in  the  respective  firm's own  quality.  The profit-
maximizing choices form  a Nash-equilibrium  in  qualities,  where  both  marginal  profit  functions  evaluate  to 
zero.  The first order conditions for the high and low quality firm,  respectively, arc then given as: 




The  slopes  of the  high  and  low  quality  finns'  quality  best  responses  can  be  calculated  (using  the  implicit 
function theorem) as  dsjldsj  = -(c(cnjlcsi)lcsj)/(c(cnjlcSi)lcSi)' where i is  either high or  low  quality and j is 
the other quality.  Both slopes arc positive, but less than onc. 
From the properties of the revenue functions and the slopes of the quality best responses, it can be 
derh'ed that the two qualities are strategic complements.  Furthermore. a forced  increase of the low quality will 
reduce product differentiation and increase price competition. 
Di\'ide the first order conditions given in (7), rearrange and write sh = r So and bo = a bh to obtain: 
4(2-3r+4r2)  r 
4r2 -7r  a 
For a=1  ( i.e.  bo = bh = b) r = 5.25123 while for a=2  ( i.e.  bo = 2 bh = 2 b) r = 9.14152.  Using r to express sh 
in terms of So and substituting for sh in the first equation of (7)  allows for calculating the equilibrium qualities 
for any gi\'en value of T and b.  (However. the ratio of cost parameters a must be fixed.) 
The resulting equilibrium qualities for  i~entical firms (i.e. bh = bo 2' b) are then:30 
Sh=O.126655T  Ibandso =O.0241192T  Ib 
A.2.  Quantity (Coumot) Competition 
When  firms  uSe  quantity  as  the  strategic  variable  in  the  second  stage  of the  industry  game,  the 
behavior of the model changeS in some aspects.  Most importantly,  price competition will be reduced and  the 
low-quality firm sets its quality as a strategic substitute to the high quality (rather than a complement). 
Quantitv Competition 
To solve the game,  consider first  the inverse demand faced  by  the  high-quality and low-quality firm, 
respectively.  Let hand 0 stand for high and low quality. respectively.  These demands are then given by: 
Ph = T sh - sh % -so qo'  Po = (T - % -qo) So  (3') 
Let  i = h,  0:  let j  ~  i.  The profit function  for  firm  i is  given by Di = Piqi(Pi,Pj,Si,Sj)  - ci(si)'  Taken 
both qualities as  given,  the  quantity  reaction  functions  in  each  market are  given  as  the  solutions  to  the  first 
order conditions.  Solving the resulting equations for both quantities, equilibrium quantities are then given as: 
(4') 
30Note that T2/b enters in a multiplicative way and therefore does not affect the calculations. 23 
Given the quantity equilibrium dcpictcd above.  demands and thus profits can be expresscd in terms of 
qualities.  For positive qualities si (i = h, 0), these profit functions are: 
(5') 
Properties of the RevcnucFunctions 
Let Ri denotc firm i's revenue function.  Let hand 0 denotc high and lo\\' quality, rcspcctively. 
oRh  ~ 0',  oRo  o  ~ 0 for So  ::; 
Sh  OSo 
4sh.  oRh  oRo  -,  <  0,  -- <  0; 
7  oSo  OSh 
::;  0;  >  0:  <  O. 
Quality Competition 
Thc first order conditions for thc high and la\\' quality firm.  respccti\·cly. arc gi\'cn as: 
T
2(4sh +SJ/(4Sh -SJ3 = 2b oso 
(7) 
The slopcs of the high and low quality firms' quality best responscs can be calculated using the implicit function 
thcorem.  Both slopcs are  less than one in absolute \·alue.  The high- (10\\'-) quality bcst rcsponse has a positive 
(negativc) slopc. 
Thc rcsulting cquilibrium qualities for iqcntical firms (i.c.  bl! = bo ? b) are then: 
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qbr = quality best response, bi = bj 
Figure 3.  Quality Equilibria - Identical Firms 
E 
'.'  .;  .... : 
qbr = quality best response, bi < bj 
Figure 4. Quality Equilibria -Different Firms WORKING PAPERS  1997 
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